During the early 1950’s, one of the most popular cartoonists was Walt Kelly whose major character was Pogo. His characters were a reflection of human nature. He also ventured into politics and his most famous quotation, “We have met the enemy and he is us,” was a parody of Commander Perry’s message in 1813 after the Battle of Lake Erie. This phrase was Kelly’s response during that time period to the McCarthy Hearings but may also be appropriate in trying to answer the question as to why studies of mutual funds and investment management firms have demonstrated that over time periods of 10 years or more, most managers underperform the stock market indexes. Given that our profession has very talented, highly educated and motivated professionals, why is this a fact? It is “us”. Our thoughts on this subject are not to present any air of superiority or arrogance, but are based on years of experience and in analyzing our own mistakes. Accordingly, we have incorporated many reasons for underperformance into our investment philosophy, decision making and disciplines in order to improve our odds for success.
The dynamic duo of fear and greed detracts the most from investment returns. Fear has four main components according to many psychologists: 1) A lack of personal control 2) Sudden occurrences 3) Unfamiliarity and 4) Large scale consequences. Investing in stocks means accepting that you cannot control short term market movements or sudden occurrences such as 9/11 or the Lehman bankruptcy. However, you can control your emotional reactions, especially by understanding fear and having the mental fortitude to look at these large market declines as opportunities. A long term time horizon and a sense of history, which demonstrates market recoveries from episodes of sudden events, are very helpful. Warren Buffett frequently cites these historical patterns during times of high fear. Unfamiliarity is mitigated by a thorough understanding and knowledge of your holdings (the higher the quality, the better). One of Buffett’s valuable traits is rigorously staying within his circle of competence- perhaps another reason he has not seemed afraid while markets panicked. In this regard, this also mitigates the unfamiliarity, which affects your emotions. The large scale consequences, large financial losses for investors, can be controlled by specific diversification of investments. Of course large scale consequences usually occur after large scale appreciation, the last phase of which is marked by greed.
The emotion of greed is infused with many negative behavioral characteristics and is not as obvious to identify as fear. Greed may be expressed as an excessive pursuit of financial gain or for notoriety. It often leads to a focus on the immediate reward, not long term success. Investment managers with performance fees or an all-important track-record might pursue riskier short-run investments or trading strategies. The parts of the brain active during greedy thoughts are poisonous and inhibit thoughtful execution of a reliable investment strategy and often result in lower investment returns due to higher taxes, transaction costs, and investments in fundamentally unsound or over-priced businesses.
Overconfidence and ego can result in overestimating one’s ability and has popularized the phrase “don’t confuse a genius with a bull market.” When looking at the low cost basis of successful investments, a strong feeling of self-esteem arises. This, of course, is ego. The consequences of this ego can result in ignoring valuation disciplines or failing to notice changes in business fundamentals which could result in the loss of those paper profits. Overconfidence can also lead to thinking that your forecasting ability is far superior. Earnings estimates by Wall Street research analysts have been documented as very inaccurate, as they basically follow corporate guidance which in turn suffers from overconfidence, especially at major trend reversals.
Another emotional behavior is the effect of crowd psychology and the phenomenon of “herding” or “groupthink,” which can lead to faulty decision making and too much uniformity of opinion. According to John Train, who wrote the book “The Money Masters,” a study of eight of the best investment managers including Warren Buffett, John Templeton, and T. Rowe Price, independent thinking was a common trait among them even though all had different investment philosophies. None made decisions within a committee framework. The power to conform is also present in the investment environment when new concepts take hold and depart from reality. Those who disagreed with the “new economy” and dot.com phenomenon in the late 1990s were scorned and many industry veterans were told they were too old. Of course the penalty for not being correct short term can be ostracism or worse, loss of a job. As Lord Keynes wrote, “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for the reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Finally, there is a human tendency toward strong biases which can prevent open-mindedness, the flexibility to recognize and anticipate change, or worse, admit mistakes in judgment. One of the biggest reasons for underperformance is too many large losses on individual stocks, known as “torpedo stocks.” They blow large holes in your portfolio. Taking losses and admitting mistakes is difficult because of loss aversion, another behavioral trap, where people avoid realizing losses. Psychologists have documented that most individuals feel a loss 2.5 times greater than the same level of gain. Waiting until “my stock gets back to my cost” is not conducive to good relative investment returns. If you purchased Eastman Kodak in 1973, it took 25 years for the price of the stock to barely establish new highs and of course, now, twelve years later the company filed for bankruptcy. Leaving the topic of behavioral finance behind, there are also other reasons for underperformance and a short term time horizon is right at the top.
The average portfolio turnover in the mutual fund industry is now over 100% per year. This is a trading mentality in the quest for short term performance. We are bombarded daily with this trading mentality as demonstrated by CNBC. Studies by Morningstar, with a few exceptions, proved that the best long term records were achieved by low turnover, a characteristic of an investment mentality. Another common characteristic noted in “The Money Masters,” was discipline and patience. This does not mean a “buy and hold forever” decision as the business and investment worlds have changed, not just in relation to technology, but to the higher risk of global competition. Selling highly overvalued stocks, even in great companies, is appropriate. Volatility is higher than 30 or 40 years ago, so a 25% turnover ratio is not excessive. Good valuation disciplines are important and it leads to lower turnover in some years and higher in others, usually near market valuation extremes.
Adopting and executing a disciplined investment philosophy and decision-making process is the cornerstone of superior long term investment returns. This is very easy to say and yet difficult to implement at investment firms. Staying true to your philosophy when your style is out of favor in the current market environment and facing one or more years of underperformance becomes even more challenging as client pressures for better relative returns increase. The fear of losing clients and revenues can result in diluting your disciplines to avoid the consequences of possible loss revenue. Although a change could result in better short term relative returns, it usually occurs toward the end of any speculative excesses. Thus when the cycle ends, the end result is short term underperformance becomes a greater long term problem. Some will argue that this pressure is better understood than 30 years ago and I would agree to some extent. However, human nature does not change totally. For example, if you are a consultant that recently hired an investment manager and they subsequently experience short term underperformance, the current short term time horizons will increase the pressure they experience from their clients. Popular strategies advocating greater diversification in styles, including hedge funds, private equity and other asset classes have lessened this risk. However, this solution by itself contributes to average returns through over-diversification and higher fee structures.
There is no one way to “skin a cat,” so different philosophies can work if executed well over the long term. We do take exception to any approach which puts great emphasis on economic forecasting and specific sector approaches. The evidence is overwhelming that the odds of this approach producing superior long term returns are very low. It is simple fact that no one can predict the economy consistently, especially at key turning points. That also relates to any strategy that attempts to time the stock market. One of the best examples occurred after the speculative excesses in the late 1990s. If you had been able to predict the collapse of the technology and large capitalization growth stock bubble and the subsequent 46% decline in the S&P 500 from 2000-2002, cash would have been favored. Yet due to the excellent values available in the smaller sized quality growth stocks, it was possible to produce very positive returns over those three years. The conventional wisdom that large caps are less risky than small caps did not apply then, due to valuation discrepancy of companies of similar quality. Cash is appropriate when opportunities are not present and/or the risk environment is excessive.
In summary, the reasons for not attaining superior long term relative returns are a result of our own failings which can be controlled. The environment for emphasis on short term performance that has been a complaint since the 1970s has only gotten worse and may not change any time soon. Human nature will not change either. The study of financial history and the repetition of stock market fads and manias is testimony to our short memories. However, the execution of sound disciplines on a consistent, long-term basis, as well as a healthy, independent, and contrary mind can go a long way toward improving our record.
January 2012 James F. Jollay






